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Abstract
The physical layer security of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is analyzed. A
stochastic geometry approach is applied to analyze the coverage probability and the effective secrecy
throughput (EST) of the kth NOMA user, where a fixed or an adaptive transmission rate can be used. A
protected zone around the legitimate terminals to establish an eavesdropper-exclusion area. We assume
that the channel state information associated with eavesdroppers is not available at the base station. We
consider that the base station is equipped with multiple antennas. The impact of imperfect successive
interference cancellation is also taken into account in this work. Our analysis allows an easy selection
of the wiretap code rates that maximizes the EST. Additionally, our framework also allows an optimum
selection of other system parameters like the transmit power or the eavesdropper-exclusion radius.
Index Terms
Effective secrecy throughput (EST), non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), physical layer secu-
rity, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has recently been introduced as a new feature
intended to increase the spectrum efficiency in the fifth generation (5G) networks [1, 2]. This
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2technique allows serving multiple users simultaneously using the same spectrum resources at
the cost of increased intra-cell interferences [3]. NOMA may use the power domain jointly
with interference cancellation techniques to separate signals, exploiting the path loss differences
among users.
In uplink (UL) NOMA, a set of users transmits simultaneously their signals to their associated
base station (BS). As a consequence, the received signal of a particular user suffers from intra-
cluster interference, which is a function of the channel statistics of other users. In order to
minimize such interference, the BS may apply successive interference cancellation (SIC) to
decode signals. SIC technique requires that different message signals arrive to the receiver (BS)
with a sufficient power difference so that SIC may be successfully applied. This is typically
achieved in the downlink (DL) by means of different weights at the transmitter. However, since
the UL channel gains already provide sufficient distinctness between the received signals, such
weights are not necessary. In fact, the conventional UL transmit power control intended to
equalize the received signal powers of users is not recommended for UL NOMA transmissions
since it may remove channel distinctness [3].
SIC technique in UL NOMA works as follows. The BS first decodes the strongest signal
by considering the signals from other users as noise. However, the user with the weakest
signal enjoys zero intra-cluster interference since the BS has previously canceled interfering
signals (considering ideal conditions). If we consider the possibility of a SIC failure, the error
is propagated to all remaining messages. UL NOMA was firstly presented in [4], by considering
the minimum mean squared error (MMSE)-based SIC decoding at the BS. An interesting survey
on NOMA for 5G networks is presented in [5], which provides a comprehensive overview of
the latest NOMA research results and innovations. A novel dynamic power allocation scheme
for DL and UL NOMA is proposed in [6]. The outage performance and the achievable sum data
rate for UL NOMA is theoretically analyzed in [7]. In [8], a framework to analyze multi-cell
UL NOMA with stochastic geometry is presented. In [9], the optimum received UL power levels
using a SIC detector is determined analytically for any number of transmitters.
The possibility of having a secure communication in NOMA-based scenarios is also a current
hot topic. The presence of eavesdroppers is a classical problem in communication theory, ever
since Wyner introduced the wiretap channel [10]. In the last years, the field of physical layer
security over different scenarios has taken an important interest in the research community as a
means to provide reliable secure communications, relaxing the complexity and complementing
3the performance of the required cryptographic technologies. For instance, [11] the authors
consider the secure transmission of information over an ergodic fading channel in the presence of
an eavesdropper. An extension of this work considering a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channel is analyzed in [12]. In [13], an analysis is conducted on the probability of secrecy
capacity for wireless communications over the Rician fading channels. The communication
between two legitimate peers in the presence of an external eavesdropper in the context of
free-space optical (FSO) communications is analyzed in [14]. In [15], a comprehensive survey
on various multiple-antenna techniques in physical layer security is provided, with an emphasis
on transmit beamforming designs for multiple-antenna nodes. An overview on the state-of-the-
art works on physical layer security technologies that can provide secure communications in
wireless systems is given in [16].
In the particular field of physical layer security with NOMA, a small number of contributions
are available. A simple scenario for a DL NOMA with just one eavesdropper (SISO antenna
configuration) in a single cell is addressed in [17]. An analysis of the optimal power allocation
policy that maximizes the secrecy sum rate for a DL NOMA scenario is presented in [18]. In
[19], a cooperative NOMA system with a single relay is analyzed assuming that the NOMA
users are affected by an eavesdropper. The work in [20] analyzes the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) in a single-cell DL NOMA scenario in which the eavesdroppers are not part of the cellular
system. [21] extends previous work by proposing several mechanisms to enhance the SOP in
a DL NOMA multi-antenna aided transmission. In [22], a downlink NOMA scenario with
multiple-input single-output (MISO) is addressed, proposing a secure beamforming transmission
scheme. The secrecy performance of a two-user downlink NOMA with transmit antenna selection
schemes is analyzed in [23]. The work in [24] studies the secrecy performance of a dowlink of
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) scenario, focusing on the impact of a max-min transmit
antenna selection strategy. Very recently, one work addressing physical layer security in UL
NOMA was published [25], although it does not make use of any stochastic geometry tool since
locations are deterministic.
A. Motivation and Contributions
The main technical differences and challenges on analyzing the physical layer security in
uplink NOMA from the existing studies for downlink NOMA are the following:
4• In the uplink NOMA, the BS receives transmissions from all users simultaneously, and
consequently, intra-cell interference to a given user is a function of the channel statistics
of other users within the cell; however, in downlink NOMA, the intra-cell interference to a
user is a function of its own channel statistics [8].
• Intra-cluster interfering signals in the uplink NOMA are also the desired signals, therefore,
it is not possible to provide the benefits of SIC (enhance the SINR) unequivocally for all
users.
• In the uplink NOMA, eavesdroppers are randomly positioned near the N legitimate trans-
mitters, independently of the transmitters’ location within the cell, whereas in the downlink
NOMA, the base station is the unique transmitter, thus simplifying the scenario.
In this work, we provide a characterization of the physical layer security of UL NOMA. In
particular, we provide the following contributions:
1) We provide new analytical expressions for UL NOMA at the base station with multiple
antennas, random spatial locations of eavesdroppers and a protection radius around the
legitimate users. This scenario has not been addressed yet to the best of the authors
knowledge. We consider a protected zone around the LUs to establish an eavesdropper
exclusion area.
2) We analyze the effective secrecy throughput (EST) [26] for uplink NOMA as a performance
metric that captures the two key features of wiretap channels (reliability and secrecy) for
any number of legitimate users.
3) We analyze previous metrics under two different scenarios: fixed and adaptive transmission
schemes from LUs. In the case of fixed transmission rate, the impact of assuming a perfect
or imperfect SIC is studied. Our analysis allows determining the wiretap code rates that
achieve the locally maximum EST for both scenarios.
B. Organization and Notation
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system model under analysis is
introduced in Section II. The analysis of the Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR)
distributions for both legitimate users and eavesdroppers is presented in Section III. In Section
IV, analytical expressions for the EST under different scenarios are derived. Numerical results
are shown and described in Section V. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section VI.
5Notation: Throughout this paper, E[·] stands for the expectation operator and P for the
probability measure. Random variables (RV) are represented with capital letters whereas lower
case is reserved for deterministic values and parameters. If X is a RV, fX(·), FX(·), F¯X(·)
and LX(·) represent its probability density function (pdf), cumulative distribution function (cdf),
complementary cdf (ccdf) and Laplace transform of its pdf, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We focus on the UL communication scenario in which LUs are connected to a base station
(BS) of radius rc and centered at the origin. We assume a single cell scenario, as considered in
most previous studies related to NOMA [1, 6, 7, 9, 18, 20, 21, 27]. A number of eavesdroppers
(EDs) are randomly distributed along the whole plane, attempting to intercept the communication
between LUs and BS. The spatial distribution of EDs is modeled using a homogeneous Poisson
Point Process (PPP) uniformly distributed in R2, which is denoted by Φe and associated with a
density λe. An eavesdropper-exclusion zone of radius rp (in which no eavesdroppers are allowed
to roam) is introduced around the LUs for improving the secrecy performance, as it is also
considered in [21] for the downlink. Fig. 1 shows the system model under analysis.
Base Station
Legitimate user
Eavesdropper
rd
rp
R1
Rk
RN
Fig. 1. System model for secure transmission in UL NOMA
At each radio resource, the BS gives service to N simultaneous LUs (using NOMA), whose
positions are random inside the cell. We assume a random scheduling, i.e. the BS selects randomly
the set of N LUs to be scheduled in a given radio resource according to NOMA. The locations
6of the LUs that are scheduled in a single radio resource are assumed to be uniformly distributed
in the cell. Hence, we consider that the resulting set of points (LUs) inside the disk B(0, rc) is
a Binomial Point Process (BPP) ΦB with N points, as it is normally assumed in the literature
[7, 27]. The assumption of a BPP for LUs (instead of a PPP) is due to tractability issues, but
at the same time, it provides the necessary spatial correlation between the nodes that are served
by the BS.
We assume that both legitimate transmitters (LUs) and eavesdroppers are equipped with a
single antenna each whereas the BS is equipped with M uncorrelated receive antennas and
applies a Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC) reception. We also assume that LUs’ channels and
EDs’ channels are subject to independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading with equal block length.
UL transmit power control is not recommended as justified in the introduction section, and hence,
it is not used.
We also consider that the eavesdroppers apply the same SIC method than the BS in order
to separate the signals from each transmitter, so that they can technically compromise the
communication from each user in the network (and specially if colluding eavesdroppers are
considered, which is not the case in this paper). That is, the eavesdroppers measure the received
signal power and first decodes the strongest signal by treating other signals as noise. Afterwards,
it cancels the first decoded signal and continues decoding the second strongest signal, and so
on. We consider the most detrimental eavesdropper scenario in order to simplify the code rate
design.
As stated in [3], the impact of the path-loss factor is generally more dominant than channel
fading effects. Hence, for tractability reasons, we assume that ordering of the received signal
powers can be approximately achieved by ordering the distances of the users to their serving
BS. Let Rk be the distance between the kth user and the BS, being R1 ≤ Rk ≤ RN . Power loss
due to propagation is modeled using a standard path loss model with α > 2, whereas a Rayleigh
model is assumed for small-scale fading. Hence, the received signal power at a distance Rk can
be simply computed as HkRk−α, where Hk is the fading coefficient. Note that, since we consider
a MRC reception technique at the BS, the desired signal is given by the sum of M independent
unit-mean exponentially distributed random variables, yielding a Gamma distribution with ccdf
given by
FHk(M,x) = e
−x ·
M−1∑
r=0
xr
r!
(1)
7We consider an scenario in which EDs are not a part of the cellular system (passive eaves-
dropping) and therefore, the channel state information (CSI) associated with EDs’ channel is
not available at the base station. In addition, we address two different cases regarding the LUs
transmission mode:
• Fixed transmission rate: LUs transmit their information towards their BS at a fixed rate. In
this scenario, we find the optimum values for the wiretap code rates, taking into account
the reliability outage probability that occurs when the selected fixed rate exceeds the
instantaneous channel capacity.
• Adaptive transmission rate: the BS enforces an adaptive secure transmission from LUs
assuming a perfect channel estimation. In this scenario, we find the optimum value of the
redundancy rate, Re, that maximizes the secrecy performance.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SINR DISTRIBUTIONS
First, we analyze the connection related statistics of this scenario using a stochastic geometry
approach. We assume that the BS applies SIC to detect the UL transmission from the nearest
user first, and afterwards, it continues decoding the information from other users up to user N .
The received instantaneous SINR at the BS of the kth user can be written as:
γk =
HkR
−α
k
I + 1/ρb
(2)
where I =
∑N
j=k+1HjR
−α
j represents the intra-cluster interference due to other NOMA users;
ρb represents the transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) defined as ρb = PTσ2b , being PT transmit
power at the user terminal and σ2b the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power received at
the BS. Note that (2) represents the SINR associated with the decoding process of the message
from user k subject to the correct decoding process from previous NOMA users (from user 1
to k − 1) so that their intra-cluster interference has been successfully canceled. Also note that
the SINR expression for the last user is simplified to γN = ρbHNR−αN since the intra-cluster
interference has been completely canceled.
A. Distribution of the SINR of Legitimate Users
In this section we compute the coverage probability of the legitimate users, i.e. the complemen-
tary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of their received SINR at the BS, which represents
the probability for a user to have a SINR higher than a given threshold t.
8Lemma 1. In the case of M antennas at the BS, the ccdf of the SINR for the kth user, pk(t),
is given by
F¯γk(t) =
∫ rc
0
e−ψ/ρb
M−1∑
r=0
r∑
k=0
ψr(−1)k
(r − k)!k!ρr−kb
dk
dsk
LI|rk (s) |s=ψ
× 2
rc
Γ
(
k + 1
2
)
Γ (N + 1)
Γ (k) Γ
(
N + 3
2
) β (r2k
r2c
; k +
1
2
, N − k + 1
)
drk (3)
with ψ = trαk and
LI|rk(s) =
2
(
rα+2c 2F1
[
1, α+2
α
, 2 + 2
α
,− rαc
trαk
]
− rα+2k 2F1
[
1, α+2
α
, 2 + 2
α
,−1
t
])
trαk (r
2
c − r2k) (α + 2)
N−k (4)
where 2F1(·, ·, ·, ·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function defined in [28] (Ch. 15), Γ(z) =∫∞
0
tz−1e−tdt stands for the Euler Gamma function, β(x; a, b) is the beta density function defined
as β(x; a, b) = (1/B(a, b))xa−1(1− x)b−1, being B(a, b) the beta function, which is expressible
in terms of Gamma functions as B(a, b) = Γ(a)Γ(b)/Γ(a + b). Note that (3) just includes one
finite integral, which can be also computed by the Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature relationship
[29].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1. In the case of single antenna (M = 1) at the BS, the ccdf of the SINR for the kth
user, pk(t), is simplified to
F¯γk(t) =
∫ rc
0
e−tr
α
k /ρb
2
(
rα+2c 2F1
[
1, α+2
α
, 2 + 2
α
,− rαc
trαk
]
− rα+2k 2F1
[
1, α+2
α
, 2 + 2
α
,−1
t
])
trαk (r
2
c − r2k) (α + 2)
N−k
× 2
rc
Γ
(
k + 1
2
)
Γ (N + 1)
Γ (k) Γ
(
N + 3
2
) β (r2k
r2c
; k +
1
2
, N − k + 1
)
drk (5)
Corollary 2. In the case of single antenna (M = 1) at the BS, the coverage probability for the
farthest user (N ) is simplified to
F¯γN (t) =
2N
αr2Nc
(
t
ρb
)− 2N
α
[
Γ
(
2N
α
)
− Γ
(
2N
α
,
rαc t
ρb
)]
(6)
where Γ(·, ·) stands for the upper incomplete Gamma function.
9Proof. The farthest user (N ) experiences no intra-cluster interference, so its coverage probability
can be expressed as
F¯γN (t) =
∫ rc
0
e−tr
α
N/ρbfRN (rN)drN
=
∫ rc
0
e−tr
α
N/ρb
2N
rc
(
r2N
r2c
)
drN (7)
After minor manipulations, the proof is complete.
B. Distribution of the SNR of eavesdroppers
We address worst-case scenario, in which eavesdroppers are assumed to have strong detection
capabilities. Specifically, by applying multi-user detection techniques, the multi-user data stream
received at the BS can be also distinguished by the eavesdroppers.
We consider the most detrimental eavesdropper, which is not necessarily the nearest one, but
the one having the best channel to the LU that is transmitting towards the BS. Therefore, the
instantaneous received SNR at the most detrimental eavesdropper (with respect with any LU)
can be expressed as follows:
γe = max
e∈Φe
{
ρeHeR
−α
e
}
(8)
where ρe represents the transmit SNR defined as ρe = PTσ2e , being PT transmit power at the LU
and σ2e the AWGN power received at the eavesdropper.
Lemma 2. Assuming an eavesdropper-exclusion zone or radius rp around the LUs, the cdf of
the SNR for the most detrimental eavesdropper can be computed as follows:
Fγe(t)= exp
[
−2piλeΓ
(
2/α, rαp t/ρe
)
α(t/ρe)
2/α
]
(9)
Proof. Taking into account that EDs follow a PPP distribution, we can express the cdf of the
SNR for the most detrimental eavesdropper as follows:
Fγe(t) = 1− pe(t) = EΦe
{∏
e∈Φe
FHe (tr
α
e /ρe)
}
(a)
= exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
(1− FHe (trαe /ρe)) redre
]
= exp
[
−2piλe
∫ ∞
rp
ree
−trαe /ρedre
]
(10)
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where (a) comes from the Probability Generating Functional (PGFL) [30]. Solving the last
integral, the proof is complete.
In the particular case of no eavesdropper-exclusion zone, (9) is simplified to:
Fγe(t)|rp=0 = exp
[
−2piλeΓ (2/α)
α(t/ρe)
2/α
]
(11)
IV. SECRECY RATE METRICS
Let Rs be the secrecy rate in a legitimate link, i.e. the rate of transmitted confidential
information. This rate can be computed as:
Rs , Rb −Re ≥ 0, (12)
where Rb represents the codeword rate from the LU to the BS, i.e. rate at which the codeword
is transmitted, including the confidential message and redundancy; Re quantifies the redundancy
rate, i.e. rate associated with redundant information for providing physical layer security in the
message transmission. Roughly, a larger Re provides a higher secrecy level.
On the one hand, if we select a codeword rate such that Rb ≤ Cb (being Cb the capacity of
the legitimate channel), a reliability constraint is ensured. On the other hand, if the redundancy
rate is above the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel, i.e. Re > Ce, a secrecy constraint is
achieved.
Depending on whether the CSI of LU and ED links are available at the BS, such rates can be
adapted to the channel or not. Most of previous works on physical layer security compute the
secrecy capacity as Cs = [Cb − Ce]+, where [x]+ = max {0, x} [31], although this definition
implicitly requires that both Cb and Ce are available. In our scenario, this assumption is not
realistic since EDs are not part of the cellular system. Subsequently, we do not use the typical
information-theoretic formulation related to the secrecy capacity but a recent formulation of a
new metric, referred to as the effective secrecy throughput (EST) [26], which captures both the
reliability constraint and the secrecy constraint as independent terms. The EST of a wiretap
channel quantifies the average secrecy rate at which the messages are transmitted from the LUs
to the BS without being leaked to the eavesdroppers, and can be defined as
Φ(Rb, Re) = (Rb −Re) [1−Or(Rb)] [1−Os(Re)] (13)
where the term (Rb−Re) represents the rate of transmitted confidential information, i.e. Rs; and
the term [1 − Or(Rb)] [1 − Os(Re)] quantifies the probability that the information is securely
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transmitted from the LUs to the BSs, being [1−Or(Rb)] associated with the reliability constraint
and [1 − Or(Re)] associated with the secrecy constraint. We assume a normalized bandwidth
W = 1, and therefore, secrecy rate and capacity metrics are measured in bits/s.
We have chosen the EST as a secrecy performance metric in this paper as it allows for explicitly
designing the wiretap code rates that satisfy certain reliability and secrecy constraints. This is not
the case when using conventional secrecy metrics such as the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP)
P(Cs < Rs) (where Rs is defined as the threshold rate under which secure communication cannot
be achieved) or the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity P(Cs > 0). Besides, and
despite being a relatively recent performance metric, the EST has been used in numerous recent
works [25, 26, 32–39]. Additionally, the evaluation of the SOP poses an additional challenge
from an analytical perspective in this specific scenario, since it includes an additional infinite
integral.
A. Adaptive Transmission Rate
In this scenario, the BS enforces an adaptive transmission scheme from LUs in the UL.
Theorem 1. The EST for the NOMA kth user in case of adaptive transmission is given by
Φk(Re) =
(
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
2Re−1
F¯γk(z)
1 + z
dz − Fγk(2Re − 1)Re
)
Fγe
(
2Re − 1) (14)
where F¯γk(·) and Fγe(·) were given in (5) and (9), respectively.
Proof. In case of adaptive transmission, Rb can be optimally chosen as Rb = Cb, and hence,
the reliability constraint can be always guaranteed, i.e. the reliability outage probability is zero:
Or(Rb) = 0. Therefore, the EST for the NOMA kth user can be defined as
Φk(Re) = (Ck −Re) [1−Os(Re)] (15)
where the term Ck represents the ergodic capacity for the kth user. Note that, in the adaptive
transmission scheme, Re is adjusted within the constraint 0 < Re < Ck. Since Rb = Cb,
we need to guarantee that Cb = log2(1 + γb) > Re, that is, γb > 2Re − 1. Therefore, assuming
a normalized channel bandwidth W = 1, the average capacity for the kth user, Ck, can be
expressed as
Ck =
∫ ∞
2Re−1
log2 (1 + γ) fγk(γ)dγ. (16)
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Using integration by parts with u = log2(1 + γ), dv = fγk(γ) and v = − (1− Fγk(γ)), the
average capacity can be also expressed as
Ck = F¯γk(2
Re − 1)Re + 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
2Re−1
F¯γk(z)
1 + z
dz (17)
The secrecy outage probability term can be computed as
Os(Re) = P(Re < Ce) = P(γe > 2Re − 1) = 1− Fγe(2Re − 1). (18)
Substituting (18) and (17) into (15), the proof is complete.
Remark 1 (Impact of eavesdroppers density, λe). In view of Theorem 1, it can be deduced that,
for λe = 0, the term associated with the secrecy constraint, Or(Re), is null; hence, the EST is
mainly determined by the capacity of the LU’s link. On the other hand, the EST tends to zero
as λe grows since expression (14) always satisfies that lim
λe→∞
Φk (Re) = 0, ∀rp ∈ [0,∞); this is
due to the fact that the fading distribution introduces a non-null probability of having a higher
instantaneous capacity for the eavesdropper than for the legitimate user.
Remark 2 (Impact of eavesdropper-exclusion radius, rp). In view of expression (14), it can be
noted that the only term that depends on rp is the cdf of the SNR of the worst eavesdropper,
Fγe
(
2Re − 1); for rp = 0, this term is simplified to (11), whereas for rp → ∞, this term
satisfies that Fγe
(
2Re − 1) |rp→∞ = 1, that is, eavesdroppers do not have any impact on the
EST performance.
B. Fixed Transmission Rate
In case the LUs use a fixed transmission rate, the reliability constraint cannot be always
guaranteed, i.e. a reliability outage must be taken into account as
Or(Rb) = P(Rb > Cb) (19)
Therefore, an outage may occur whenever a message transmission is either unreliable or non
secure.
Regarding the reliability constraint term, Or(Rb), we address in our analysis the impact of
imperfect SIC and detection probability for NOMA. Note that the signals from the intra-cluster
interfering users may or may not be decoded perfectly; therefore, SIC may or may not be
performed in a perfect fashion. As a consequence, we distinguish two cases: perfect and imperfect
SIC.
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The reliability constraint term for user k in the case of perfect SIC, named as p(P )k , is given
by
p
(P )
k (Rb) = 1−Ork(Rb) = 1− P(Rb > Ck)
= 1− P(γk < 2Rb − 1) = F¯γk(2Rb − 1) (20)
That is, the reliability constraint term represents the detection probability for user k, whose
expression was obtained in (5).
Finally, the EST for user k in case of perfect SIC can be expressed as
Φ
(P )
k (Rb, Re) = (Rb −Re)F¯γk
(
2Rb − 1)Fγe (2Re − 1) (21)
However, in the case of imperfect SIC, the intra-cluster interference experienced by the kth
user depends on whether the detection for the k− 1 nearest users were successful or not, which
complicates the model significantly. In this paper we assume the worst case of imperfect SIC,
which considers that the decoding of the kth user is always unsuccessful whenever the decoding
of his relative k − 1 closest users is unsuccessful [8]. Therefore, the reliability constraint term
for the worst-case detection probability of kth user is given by:
p
(I)
k (Rb) =
k∏
i=1
F¯γi
(
2Rb − 1) (22)
Finally, the EST for user k in case of imperfect SIC can be expressed as
Φ
(I)
k (Rb, Re) = (Rb −Re)
k∏
i=1
F¯γi
(
2Rb − 1)Fγe (2Re − 1) (23)
Note that the EST expression is the same for the first NOMA user independently of the SIC
assumption, i.e. Φ(P )1 = Φ
(I)
1 , since potential detection errors occur from the second user up to
the Nth user.
A summary of secrecy metric expressions for different scenarios in shown in Table I.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, analytical results are illustrated and validated with extensive Monte Carlo
simulations in order to assess the physical layer security in UL NOMA. We conduct a thorough
performance comparison between the adaptive and fixed rate transmission schemes in terms of
EST. Main parameters are presented in Table I unless otherwise stated.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF SECRECY METRIC EXPRESSIONS FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
SCENARIO RELIABILITY
CONSTRAINT,
[1−Or(Rb)]
SECRECY
CONSTRAINT,
[1−Os(Re)]
EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT (EST), Φk
Adaptive rate 1 Fγe
(
2Re − 1) Φk(Re) = ( 1ln 2 ∫∞2Re−1 F¯γk (z)1+z dz − Fγk (2Re − 1)Re)Fγe (2Re − 1)
Fixed rate with
perfect SIC
F¯γk (2
Rb − 1) Fγe
(
2Re − 1) Φ(P )k (Rb, Re) = (Rb −Re)F¯γk (2Rb − 1)Fγe (2Re − 1)
Fixed rate with
imperfect SIC
k∏
i=1
F¯γi
(
2Rb − 1) Fγe (2Re − 1) Φ(I)k (Rb, Re) = (Rb −Re) k∏
i=1
F¯γi
(
2Rb − 1)Fγe (2Re − 1)
TABLE II
MAIN CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
rc (m) 500
α 3.8
ρb (dB) 110
ρe (dB) 90
λe (points/m2) 1e-5
A. Fixed Transmission Rate
In the case of fixed transmission rate, the reliability constraint term (or equivalently, the
detection probability) plays an important role in NOMA performance. Let us analyze first this
contribution separately.
Fig. 2 shows the detection probability results for legitimate users with perfect SIC, p(P )k , and
imperfect SIC, p(I)k . In this case, we have considered a high number of simultaneous NOMA
LUs (N = 6) randomly positioned according to a BPP in order to evaluate the performance as k
grows. In the case of perfect SIC, results show that detection probability is not a monotonically
decreasing function with k (i.e. with the distance from the kth user to the BS); instead, farthest
LUs are boosted since the intra-cluster interference term has been partially (or totally) canceled.
Note that the best result is achieved for the farthest user, k = N = 6, since perfect SIC assumes
that intra-cluster interference is fully canceled. However, in the case of imperfect SIC, the intra-
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cluster interference experienced by the kth user depends on whether the detection for k − 1
nearer users were successful or not, thus providing a monotonically decreasing function with k.
Note also that higher values of Rb lead to a lower detection probability.
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Fig. 2. Detection probability for LUs with perfect and imperfect SIC for each user k with N = 6.
Fig. 3 shows the detection probability results for legitimate users with imperfect SIC, p(I)k ,
and for eavesdroppers, pe, versus the SINR threshold t = 2Rb − 1. Results for p(I)k are obtained
from (22) considering N = 4 NOMA LUs. The detection probability of eavesdroppers, pe, is
also shown for different values of the exclusion area radius, rp. Since we consider the most
detrimental eavesdropper, i.e. the one receiving the best channel quality from the LU, the
detection probability results for the eavesdroppers may outperform the results for LUs as rp
is decreased, assuming a density of eavesdroppers of λe = 1 (default value). This undesirable
scenario can be compensated by increasing the exclusion area radius. . Results also show the
detection probability for legitimate users in case of different number of antennas at the BS,
leading to an important improvement as M grows.
Fig. 4 shows the EST for fixed rate transmission scheme and perfect SIC versus Rb and Re,
Φ
(P )
k (Rb, Re). We observe that there is a unique pair of Rb and Re that maximizes the EST. Also
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Fig. 3. Detection probability for LUs with imperfect SIC, p(I)k , and for eavesdroppers, pe, versus t = 2
Rb − 1, with N = 4
and different number of antennas M .
note that EST is null for Re ≤ Rb.
The value of Re that maximizes the EST, noted as R†e, has been determined numerically and
shown in Fig. 5 as a function of Rb and λe, with N = 2, k = 1 and rp = 50 m. Note that the
ratio between R†e and Rb is not linear. We also observe that a higher density of eavesdroppers
requires a higher redundancy rate to optimize the EST.
Fig. 6 shows a comparison between the EST for fixed rate transmission with perfect SIC,
Φ
(P )
k , and imperfect SIC, Φ
(I)
k . EST results are shown for N = 2 NOMA users as a function of
Rb, assuming a value of Re = 3 bps and rp = 50 m. We observe that the results for the first user
(k = 1) are the same for perfect and imperfect SIC since imperfect SIC models the propagation
of decoding errors from previous decoded users. We also observe that, in the case of perfect
SIC, the maximum EST for the second user is not degraded significantly compared to the first
user, as the larger distance to the BS is compensated by the fact that the second user does not
experience (ideally) any intra-cluster interference. However, in the case of imperfect SIC, the
second user is highly degraded compared to the first user due to SIC error propagation from the
17
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Fig. 4. EST with perfect SIC for fixed transmission rate with N = 2, k = 1 and rp = 50 m.
previous decoded user. Note also that the value of Rb that maximizes the EST is different of
each LU, so optimum code rate selection at the base station must be done per LU.
Fig. 7 shows the value of the minimum eavesdropper-exclusion radius (rpmin) that ensures a
certain EST value. Results are shown for the first user (k = 1), with N = 2, as a function of the
eavesdropper density (λe). It is observed that a higher eavesdropper-exclusion radius is require
to achieve the minimum EST target as λe or ρe is increased. It is also observed that for low λe
values, there is no need of including an exclusion area to achieve the EST target.
B. Adaptive Transmission Rate
In this section we provide performance results in case the BS uses the CSI of LUs to enforce
an adaptive transmission scheme.
Fig. 9 shows EST results of the first user (k = 1) as a function of the redundancy rate, Re,
assuming N = 2 NOMA users. In this case, Rb is adapted to the channel capacity, i.e. Rb = Cb,
whereas the value of Re must be properly designed. In that sense, there is a value of Re that
maximizes the EST. We also observe that higher eavesdropper-exclusion radii enhance the EST.
As mentioned before, in case of adaptive transmission, the reliability constraint does not affect
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Fig. 5. Optimum value of Re that maximizes the EST as a function of Rb and λe, considering fixed transmission with N = 2,
k = 1 and rp = 50 m.
the secrecy performance; therefore, no SIC errors are considered in this case. Note that if the
difference between ρb and ρe is higher (due to the value of σ2e compared to σ
2
b ), the EST is
considerably increased.
Fig. 8 shows a performance comparison between the EST for adaptive rate and fixed rate
transmission schemes with perfect SIC as a function of Re, with N = 2, k = 1 and rp = 50
m. Fixed rate results are plotted for different Rb values (from 1 to 9) whereas adaptive rate
transmission scheme selects a value of Rb such that Rb = Cb. It is observed that adaptive
rate transmission outperforms fixed rate transmission. The reason is that, in case of adaptive
transmission, the reliability constraint does not affect the performance as [1−Or(Rb)] = 1,
whereas in case of fixed transmission with perfect SIC: [1−Or(Rb)] = Fγe
(
2Re − 1). It is also
observed that the value of Re than maximizes the EST in both cases are different.
The impact of the eavesdropper-exclusion radius on the EST is depicted in Fig. 10. We observe
an increasing S-shape behavior as rp grows, since the most detrimental eavesdropper reduces its
detection capabilities for higher rp values. Results match perfectly with Remark 2, which stated
that for rp →∞, eavesdroppers do not have any impact on the performance.
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Fig. 6. Comparison between the EST for fixed rate transmission scheme with perfect SIC and imperfect SIC, with N = 2,
Re = 3 and rp = 50 m.
EST results as a function of the density of eavesdroppers, λe, is shown in Fig. 11. We observe
an exponential decreasing behavior with λe. As stated in Remark 1, when λe tends to zero, the
EST is mainly determined by the capacity of the LU’s link; on the contrary, when λe tends
to infinity, the EST is zero, although higher eavesdropper-exclusion radii lead to a slower EST
degradation. Results also show the performance gain as the number of antennas M is increased.
Fig. 12 shows the EST for adaptive transmission for the kth user as a function of the
transmission power (PT ) of the LU measured in dBm/Hz. We observe an optimum value of PT ,
which depends on the specific values of ρe and k. We have considered an eavesdropper-exclusion
radius of rp = 50 m and an average noise power received at the BS of σ2b = −160 dBm/Hz; note
that the default value of ρb = 110 dB would give a value of PT = −50 dBm/Hz, or equivalently,
a PT = 23 dBm for a bandwidth of 20 MHz, which is a typical power value for a micro-
cell. Results show that very low PT values lead to a very poor performance since the average
SINR of the LUs is very low (reliability constraint); on the other hand. When then transmit
power is increased, there is a optimum value above which the EST starts decreasing, since the
eavesdroppers are also increasing their detecting capabilities (secrecy constraint). Results also
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Fig. 7. Minimum value of the eavesdropper-exclusion radius (rpmin ) that ensures a target EST (Φk) as a function of λe, for
N = 2, k = 1 and Re = 1.
show that higher values of ρe = PTσ2e degrades considerably the EST. We also observe that the
performance of the first and second LUs differs significantly as ρe is increased. We must recall
that in the adaptive transmission, the last user is ideally free of intra-cluster interference, and
hence, its performance is limited by noise. Therefore, the second user is much more affected by
the value of ρe. In case of high noise power at eavesdroppers (low ρe) the second user is shown
to outperform the first user despite being further from the BS.
Fig. 12 shows the EST of the first NOMA user (k = 1) versus the transmission power Pt for
adaptive transmission as a function of the eavesdropper density, λe. We observe that the optimum
transmit power value is very affected by λe. In fact, lower eavesdropper densities lead to higher
EST, although an adjustment of the transmit power is critical to achieve such maximum. For the
limit case of no eavesdroppers (λe = 0) there is no EST degradation for high PT values, as the
secrecy constraint is null.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the performance of UL NOMA for a generic number of simultaneous
users, both from a connection level perspective and from a physical layer security viewpoint.
We considered a passive eavesdropping scenario in which the BS and LUs are not aware of their
CSI, and different cases depending on whether the LUs use a fixed or an adaptive transmission
scheme. We also considered the use of multiple antennas at the BS. Our analysis includes the
impact of an imperfect SIC during NOMA detection and an eavesdropper-exclusion radius to
enhance the secrecy metrics.
We obtained new analytical expressions for the coverage probability in the uplink for LUs and
eavesdroppers. In addition, we provide simple analytical expressions for the EST, which captures
explicitly the reliability constraint and secrecy constraint of wiretap channels. Our analysis allows
determining the wiretap code rates that achieve the maximum EST. Performance results also help
designing optimum values of the transmit power (PT ) and the eavesdropper-exclusion radius (rp)
in order to enhance the overall EST.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The ccdf of the SINR for the kth user, pk(t), assuming M antennas at the BS, can be expressed
as
F¯γk(t) = P [γk > t]
(a)
=
∫ rc
0
P [γk > t|rk] fRk(rk)drk
(b)
=
∫ rc
0
P
[
hk > t(I + ρ
−1
b )r
α
k |rk
]
fRk(rk)drk
=
∫ rc
0
EI
[
P
[
hk > t(i+ ρ
−1
b )r
α
k |rk, i
]]
fRk(rk)drk
(c)
=
∫ rc
0
e−tr
α
k/ρbEI|rk
[
e−tIr
α
k
M−1∑
r=0
(
t
(
I + ρ−1b
)
rαk
)r
r!
∣∣∣∣∣ rk
]
fRk(rk)drk (24)
where (a) and (b) follow from the total probability theorem [40], while (c) follows from the
fact that Hk has a Gamma distribution with ccdf given by (1).
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Using the binomial expansion (a+ b)r =
r∑
k=0
(
r
k
)
ar−kbk and considering ψ = trαk , it yields
F¯γk(t) =
∫ rc
0
e−ψ/ρbEI|rk
[
e−ψI
M−1∑
r=0
r∑
k=0
ψrIk
(r − k)!k!
(
1
ρb
)r−k∣∣∣∣∣ rk
]
fRk(rk)drk
=
∫ rc
0
e−ψ/ρb
M−1∑
r=0
r∑
k=0
ψr
(r − k)!k!
(
1
ρb
)r−k (∫ ∞
0
e−ψIIkfI(I)dI
)
fRk(rk)drk
=
∫ rc
0
e−ψ/ρb
M−1∑
r=0
r∑
k=0
ψr(−1)k
(r − k)!k!ρr−kb
dk
dsk
LI|rk (s) |s=ψfRk(rk)drk (25)
The term LI|rk(s) = EI|rk
[
eI |rk
]
represents the Laplace transform of the intra-cluster inter-
25
−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 400
1
2
3
λe = 10
−8 points/m2
λe = 10
−7
λe = 10
−6
λe = 10
−5
λe = 0
PT (dBm/Hz)
Φ
k
(R
e
)
Fig. 13. EST of the first NOMA user (k = 1) versus the transmission power Pt for adaptive transmission as a function of λe,
with N = 2, Re = 1, ρe = 90 dB, rp = 50 m and σ2b = −160 dBm/Hz.
ference conditioned on rk, which can be expressed as
LI|rk(s) = Erj |rk,hj
[
exp
(
−s
N∑
j=k+1
hjr
−α
j
)]
= Erj |rk,hj
[
N∏
j=k+1
exp
(−shjr−αj )
]
(a)
=
N∏
j=k+1
Erj |rk,hj
[
exp
(−shjr−αj )]
=
(
Erj |rk
[
1
1 + sr−αj
])N−k
(b)
=
(∫ rc
rk
1
1 + sr−αj
2rj
r2c − r2k
drj
)N−k
=
(
2
(
rα+2c Ω (−rαc /s)− rα+2k Ω (−rαk /s)
)
s (r2c − r2k) (α + 2)
)N−k
(26)
being Ω (x) = 2F1
[
1, α+2
α
, 2 + 2
α
, x
]
. Step (a) comes from the fact that the fading is independent
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of the BPP and, although jth users’ location are correlated with kth user when their distances
are ordered, the computation of the interference can be obtained considering that the N − k
NOMA interfering users are located within a disk whose inner radius is rk and outer radius rc.
Step (b) comes from the fact that the pdf of the distance from a randomly located point within
that disk is given by fRj |Rk (rj |rk ) = 2rj/(r2c − r2k). Note that the MRC combination does not
change the distribution of the interference in our scenario, as stated in [41, 42].
In [43], the marginal pdf of the kth nearest point to the origin of a BPP is given. In particular,
this work shows that, in a BPP consisting of N points randomly distributed in a 2-dimensional
ball of radius rc centered at the origin, the Euclidean distance Rk from the origin to its kth
nearest point follows a generalized beta distribution
fRk(rk) =
2
rc
Γ
(
k + 1
2
)
Γ (N + 1)
Γ (k) Γ
(
N + 3
2
) β (r2k
r2c
; k +
1
2
, N − k + 1
)
(27)
Substituting (26) and (27) into (24) the proof is complete.
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